Cryptanalysis of Some Hash Functions Based on Block Ciphers and Codes by WU, Hongjun et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
2002
Cryptanalysis of Some Hash Functions Based on
Block Ciphers and Codes
Hongjun WU
Feng Bao
Singapore Management University, fbao@smu.edu.sg
Robert H. DENG
Singapore Management University, robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Information Security Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized administrator of
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WU, Hongjun; Bao, Feng; and DENG, Robert H.. Cryptanalysis of Some Hash Functions Based on Block Ciphers and Codes. (2002).
Informatica: A Journal of Computing and Informatics. 26, (3), 255-258. Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/192
Informatica 26 (2002) 255-258 255 
Cryptanalysis of Some Hash Functions Based on Block Ciphers and Codes 
Hongjun Wu, Feng Bao and Robert H. Deng 
Institute for Infocomm Research 
21 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore 119613 
{hongjun, baofeng, deng} @i2r.a-star.edu.sg 
Keywords: cryptanalysis, hash function, block cipher, codes 
Received: June 2, 2002 
At PKC 2000, Inoue and Sakurai proposed some methods to design hash functions from block ciphers and 
codes (block codes and convolutional codes). They claimed that their hash functions are secure: 
2(d-l)m/2 
encryptions are necessary to find a collision, where d and m are the minimal distance of the code and the 
block size of block cipher, respectively. However, we show in this paper that a collision could be found 
with abouta • 2™ encryptions, where a is a small number. 
1 Introduction 
A hash function is a one-way function that maps an 
arbitrary-length message into a fixed-length quantity. It 
plays important roles in integrity protection, authentication 
and signature generation. There are two basic requirements 
on a secure hash function, namely, the collision resistance 
property (that it is hard to find two messages with the same 
hash result) and the preimage resistance property (that it is 
hard to find a message corresponding to a given hash re­
sult). 
There are two approaches to design hash functions. One 
approach is to design customised hash functions, such as 
the MD4 [10], MD5 [11] and SHA-1 [3]. Another ap­
proach is to design hash functions based on some existing 
secure crypto algorithms (most likely, some block ciphers). 
A number of hash functions based on block ciphers have 
been proposed. The construction of single-block-length 
hash functions (the size of the hash result is the same as 
the block size of the block cipher) has been studied ex-
tensively and a synthetic study on this issue was done by 
Preneel, Govaerts and Vandewalle [9]. The drawback of 
this design is that for block cipher with small block size 
m, the hash function is not secure since a collision could 
be found with only about 2™/^  operations due to the birth-
day attack. The multiple-block-length hash functions are 
thus needed. But it is not easy to design a secure and effi-
cient multiple-block-length hash function. Some proposed 
multiple-block-length hash functions are proved to be in-
secure: the MDC-4 [1] were broken by Knudsen and Pre­
neel [8]; the Parallel-DM [4] was broken by Knudsen and 
Lai [6]. Some multiple-block-length hash functions remain 
secure but with relatively poor performance [7, 8]. Inoue 
and Sakurai recently proposed some multiple-block-length 
hash functions and claimed that their hash functions are se­
cure and efficient [5]. Hovvever, as will be shown in this pa­
per, their hash functions are not as secure as they claimed. 
We believe that with the emergence of large block size 
block ciphers, such as the Rijndael with flexible block size 
up to 256 bits [2], the design of secure and efficient block 
cipher based hash functions could eventually be simplified. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an 
introduction to Inoue and Sakurai's hash functions. The 
cryptanalysis of Inoue and Sakurai's block code based hash 
functions and convolutional code based hash functions are 
given in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. Section 5 
concludes this paper. 
2 Inoue and Sakurai's Hash 
Functions 
Most of the hash functions are in iterated form, i.e., they 
are based on the iterative computations of an easily com-
putable compression function h{-, •). The function h{-, •) 
compresses two binary sequences of respective lengths m 
and an I into a binary sequence of length m,. The message 
M is denoted as t /-bit blocks, M = (Mi, M2, • • • , Mj) 
(In čase the length of M is not multiple of I, padding is 
used). The hash result H = Ht \s obtained by computing 
iteratively 
Hi = h{Hi_i,Mi) i = l,2,---,t, 
\^ 
vvhere Ho is a pre-specified initial value. 
The compression function of a block cipher based hash 
function is constructed from a block cipher. In the rest of 
this paper, we consider only the block cipher with equal key 
length and block size since Inoue and Sakurai's construc-
tions are based on this kind of block cipher. To construct a 
compression function/i(-, •) with m-bit output from a block 
cipher with m-bit block size, the follovving Davies-Mayer 
function could be used: 
hiMi, Hi_i) = EM, [Hi^i) e Hi-i 
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where both Mi and Hi are m-bit binary sequences. To 
construct a hash function with n • m-bit (n > 1) hash result 
from a block cipher with m-bit block size, the following 
multiple Davies-Meyer function could be used. 
Definition 1 (Multiple Davies-Meyer Function). Let 
EK{-) be a block cipher with m-bit block size and key 
length. Let /ii, /12, • • • , ^»i be different instantiations of the 
Davies-Meyer function, i.e., hi{Xi,Yi) = ExiiYi) © Yi, 
obtained by fixing [log2n] key bits to different values. 
The Mi and Hi are expanded by an affine mapping to the 
n pairs {Xi,Yi). The output is the concatenation of the 
outputs of the function /ii, /12, •' ,hn. 
To construct a compression function h based on the multi-
ple Davies-Meyer function, the main task is to design the 
affine mapping. In Knudsen and Preneers work [7, 8], non-
binary codes are used. Recently Inoue and Sakurai intro-
duced the block codes as well as the convolutional codes 
in designing the affine mapping [5]. In Inoue and Sakurai's 
affine mapping, the input are k m-bit message blocks (Mj) 
and n m-bit blocks of the previous iteration output iJi_i 
but only the message blocks Mi are encoded. Their design 
are given in the following two subsections. 
2.1 Construction with Block Codes 
The input to the affine mapping are the k m-bit message 
blocks {Mi) and n m-bit blocks of previous hashed value 
iJj_i. The fc-block Mi is encoded into n m-bit blocks, 
denoted as d, with the use of an (n, k, d) error correction 
code. From i l j - i and Cj, form n input pairs to those n 
different Davies-Meyer functions. 
A typical example in [5] is given below: 
Example 1. Consider the (7,4,3) Hamming code with the 
following generator matrix: 
G = 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Let Mi = (Mi,i, Mj,2, Mj,3, Mj,4), where Mj j is an m-
bit block. Mi is encoded as d — (Cj,i, Ci,2, • 
where dj — Mij for j = 1,2,3,4, and 
) Cij), 
Ci,5 = Mi,i © Mi,2 © Mi,3 
Ci,6 = Mi,2 © Mi,3 © Mi,4 
Ci,7 = Mi,i © Mi,2 © Mi^4 
Let Hi-i = (iJj_i_i,iJi_i^2; • • • ,Hi^ij) and Hi = 
{Hi^i, Hi^2,- • • ! Hi^i). Hi is obtained as follows: 
i?i,j = hj{Hi-ij,dj) j =: 1,2, • • • ,7 
The other block codes with higher error correction capa-
bility could also be used. It was claimed in [5] that for 
a hash function constructed from an {n,k,d) code in this 
way, about 2(''~i)™/2 encryptions are required to find a col-
lision. 
2.2 Construction with Convolutional Codes 
Let the convolutional code be with parameters (n, k, d; N), 
where n, k, d and A'' denote the output size, input size, 
minimum distance and constraint length, respectively. The 
length of a message is padded to multiple of km bits. Then 
(A^  — l)krn zero bits are padded to the message. The mes-
sage after padding is denoted as (Mi, M2, • • • , Mt), where 
each Mi is a fcm-bit block. The input to the compression 
function h{-,-) are (Mj_Ar+i,--- ,Mj) and the n-block 
Hi-i. The (Mi-AT+i, • • • , Mi) is encoded into an n-block 
code word, d — (Ci,i, Cj,2, • • • C'i,„) with the use of an 
(n, k, d; N) convolutional code. From i l j - i and d, form 
n input pairs to the n different Davies-Meyer functions. 
The final hash result is the concatenation of the last N iter-
ations' outputs {Ht-N+i,--- ,Ht~i,Ht). 
We give a simple example below to illustrate the 
operation of this kind of hash function. 
Example 2. Consider a simple (2,1,3;3) binary convolu-
tional code. For each output, the following generator ma-
trix is used: 
G = 
{Mi-3,Mi-2,Mi-i,Mi) is encoded into d = 
(Ci,i,C'i,2) vvhere 
Ci,i = Mi_3 © Mi_2 ® Mi 
dfl - Mi^3 © M"i_2 © M"i_i © Mi 
Hi is obtained as follovvs: 
Hij = hj{Hi^ij,dj) j = 1,2 
The concatenation of the outputs of the last three iterations 
are the final hash result. 
It was claimed in [5] that for a hash function constructed 
from an (n, k, d; N) convolutional code in this way, about 
2(d.-i)m/2 encryptions are needed to find a collision. 
3 Attack on the Hash Functions 
Based on Block Codes 
Inoue and Sakurai claimed that about 2^'^"^)'"/^ encryp-
tions are needed to find a collision of their hash functions 
based on block codes [5]. In this section, we give an attack 
to find a collision with only about d • 2™ encryptions. The 
flaw in Inoue and Sakusai's design is that the differences 
introduced into the n-block hash output do not affect one 
" 1 
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another in the follovving iterations, i.e., there is no differ-
ence propagation. It allovvs us to deal with those differ-
ences separately. 
Our attack is based on the following assumption: 
Assumption 1. Consider a Davies-Mayer function 
h{X,Y) = Ex{Y) © Y, where Ek{-) is a block cipher 
with m-bit block size and m-bit key length. For two 
randomly chosen Y and Y' with Y ^ Y', an X satisfying 
h{X, Y) =: h{X, Y') exits with probability 0.368. 
The follovving attack is to find two different messages M 
and M' satisfying Hash{M) = Hash{M'), where the 
hash function is based on an (n, k, d) block cede. 
1. Find a A;-block AMi so that (n — d) blocks of its 
n-block code word are with value zero. The posi-
tions of those non-zero blocks are denoted as £ = 
(ei, 62, • • • ,ed), where 1 < ei <n. 
2. Randomly choose Mi and let M[ = Mi ® AMi. 
Then H[ ^ Hi and they differ at d blocks indicated 
by the set E. 
3. In this step, we try to find M2 = Mj that eliminates 
the difference at the cith block of the hash output, i.e., 
vve aim at achieving H2,ei = -^ 2^ ei 
(a) Find an m-bit c such that /lej (i?i,ei ,c) = 
/ le i ( i?{^ej ,c ) , i.e., i?2,ei = ^2,ei- ^^ ''^^^ ^^^^ 
a collision could not be found, go to step 2, se-
lect a different Mi and repeat the attack. 
(b) Choose M2 such the eith block of its code word 
is C, i.e., C2, C. 
(c) Let M^ = M2. Clearly, C^^,^ = Cz.ei = c. 
Thus i?2,ei = -f^2,ei' '-S-' -^ 2^ and M2 are the 
desired message blocks. 
4. Similar to step 2, find M3 = M3 so that the difference 
at the e2th block of the output is eliminated. Repeat 
the similar attacks until ali those d differences in the 
hash output are eliminated. 
5. The M and M' (with only Mi 7^  M{) constructed 
above are vvith the same hash result. 
We note that according to Assumption 1, the Step 3 in 
the attack could succeed vvith about 2™ encryptions. Thus 
the total amount of computations required in this attack is 
about d • 2 " . 
4 Attack on the Hash Functions 
Based on Convolutional Codes 
Inoue and Sakurai claimed that about 2(''~^)™/^ encryp-
tions are needed to find a collision of their hash functions 
based on convolutional codes [5]. In this section, vve give 
an attack to find such a collision vvith only about n • 2"" en-
cryptions. Similar to the attack in Section 3, our attack in 
this section is to eliminate the differences in the hash output 
separately. 
The foUovving attack is to find tvvo different messages 
M and M' satisfylng Hash{M) = Hash{M'), where 
the hash function is based on an (n, k, d; N) convolutional 
code. 
1. Randomly select tvvo A;-block Mi and M{ vvith Mi 7^  
M[. 
2. Randomly set the values of Mi {2 < i < N). Let 
Ml = Mi foT i = 2,3,-•• ,N + 1, i.e., at the begin-
ning of the (A'' + 2)th iteration, the message blocks in 
the memory are the same for M and M'. 
3. At the (A'' + 2)th iteration, the only difference vve need 
to consider is that HN+I ^ ^N+I- ^^ '^is step, vve 
try to eliminate the difference betvveen the first blocks 
of iJAr+2 andFjy_,_2. 
(a) Find an m-bit c such that hi{H^r^i^i,c) = 
/ii(iJJv+i 1'^)- ^^ ^^^^ ^"''h collision could not 
be found, go to step 2, select a different MAT+I 
and repeat the attack. 
(b) Choose M^+2 such that the first block of the 
(A'^  + 2)th code vvord is c, i.e., Civ+2,1 = c. 
(c) Let M ; / + 2 = MN+2- Then C'r^+2,1 = 
^N+21 = C since M, = Ml for i = 
2,Z,-'-,N + 2. Thus Fiv+2,1 = -ffw+2,i-
The Miv+2 and M'^_^2 '^^ ^^ e^ desired message 
blocks. 
4. Carry out the similar attack to eliminate the remaining 
differences at those (n — 1) blocks of the hash output 
in the next (n — 1) iterations. 
5. At the end of the (A'^  -I- n -I- l)th iteration, i?Ar_|_„_|_i = 
-H /^v+n+i- ^^'^ there is no difference in the memory. 
LetM;/+„_^I+. = MN+n+i+i fori = l,2,--- ,N-
1. 
6. From the (2A'^  + n)lh iteration on, any final hash out-
puts (the concatenation of the last A'^  hash outputs) 
vvould be the same. 
We note that according to Assumption 1, the Step 3 in 
the attack could succeed vvith about 2™ encryptions. Thus 
the total amount of computations required in this attack is 
about n •2'". 
In addition, vve point out here that the claim in [5] that 
"this (the convolutional codes based hash function) reduces 
the Circuit complexity of the hardvvare-implementation 
l/N times in terms of the number of Davies-Mayers's 
module function than that based on block error correcting 
codes" is misleading. The hash function, no matter it is 
based on block codes or convolutional codes, could be im-
plemented vvith only one Davies-Mayer's module function 
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in the hardware implementation. The reason is that those 
Davies-Mayer functions are ali based on the same block 
cipher. 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we show that only about a • 2"* encryptions are 
needed to find a collision of Inoue and Sakurai's hash func-
tions based on the block codes and convolutional codes. 
The claim that a collision could only be found with about 
2(d-i)m/2 encryptions is incorrect. 
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We investigate the security ofthe AES S-box in the view of Boolean function with the technigue of Walsh 
spectrum. The cryptographic characteristics of AES such as linearity, nonlinearity, strict avalanche, 
propagation and correlation immunity are revealed. 
1 Introduction 
Substitution box(S-box)'''^' is a core component of most 
of the modem block ciphers and often servers as the only 
nonlinear component of the algorithms. In other words, 
the nonlinearity and cryptographic security of the 
cryptosystems depends heavily on the strength of the S-
box. It is the same čase for the algorithm Rijndael'^' 
which is the Advanced Encryption Standard(AES) of 
USA. When Joan Danmen and Vincent Rijmen proposed 
this algorithm, they focused upon the resistance to the 
differential cryptanalysis'''' and the linear cryptanalysis'^l 
We once verified this by vvorking out the 2*x2^ 
differential matrices and the linear matrices of AES and 
found that AES does show significant performance as the 
designers acclaimed! But vvhat things are if we view the 
S-box of AES as a set of Boolean functions? We discuss 
this issue in this work with Walsh spectrum'^ '^ ^ as a 
mathematical tool. The cryptographic properties of AES 
such as linearity, nonlinearity, strict avalanche criteria 
(SAC),propagation criteria(PC) and correlation immunity 
(CI) are analysed and some new conclusions are drawn 
for the first time. 
(l)View the State bytes as elements of field GF{2*) and 
take the multipHcative inverse under the irreducible 
polynomial m{x) = x^ + x'^ + x^ + x + \ vvith the element 
zero mapped onto itself 
(2)An affine transformation is applied on the result of (1) 
The fixed matrix and the fixed vector over GF{2) in the 
affine transformation are shown in Figure l(with yo the 
most significant bit). 
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Fig.l Affine transformation of AES ByteSub 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is 
dedicated to the introduction of the structure of AES S-
box and the eight truth tables of Boolean functions are 
given. Section 3 summarizes the Walsh spectrum theory 
and its applications in the analysis of cryptosystems. 
Theory of Walsh spectrum is employed in Section 4 to 
analyze the AES Boolean functions and some new 
remarks are made. We conclude the paper in Section 5. 
2 AES S-box 
The 8 X 8 S-box of AES performs a nonlinear trans­
formation called byte substitution'^' which operates inde-
pendently on each of the State bytes. The substitution is 
invertible and is constructed by the composition of two 
transformations as described as below. 
^0,0 
«1,0 
«2,0 
«3,0 
« 0 , 
^ 1 , 
« 2 , 
«3,1 
« / 
%-f 
^la 
«3.2 
«0,3 
«1,3 
«2.3 
«3.3 
^0,0 
^ , 0 
^2.0 
^ . 0 
^o,ir%.2 
*., 
* 2 , I 
^ . 1 
K 
^2.2 
*3,2 
^ , 3 
^2.3 
*3,3 
Fig.2 AES ByteSub 
Fig.2 illustrates the overall effect of the byte substitution 
on the State. In practical realization, the whole trans­
formation is expressed in the form of a table and is 
worked out in advance for the purpose of less reduplicate 
calculation and faster speed. The ByteSub table is in fact 
a permutation over GF(2'). Since the S-box is vievved in 
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this paper as a set of Boolean functions, we derive the 
eight truth tables of the AES S-box as shown in Table 1 
directly from the ByteSub table. The truth tables help to 
compute the corresponding Walsh spectrum. 
The first digit of each line in the Table 1 is the ftinction 
value of the input '00000000' and the last one of ' 1111 
uir . 
3 Walsh Spectrum 
Walsh transformation is an iniportant tool to analyse the 
properties of Boolean functions such as balancedness, 
linear structures, the best linear approximation, 
nonlinearity, Bentness, SAC, PC and C\. Here we sum-
marize the concept of Walsh spectrum and its application 
in the analysis of cryptographic properties mentioned 
above. 
Defmition l'^ '^'^  The Walsh transformation of n-tuple 
Boolean function f(x) is defined as 
where weGF(2") , w»x = •%Xo+---+H'„_|X„_| . Sf(w) is 
also called the type-1 Walsh spectrum of f{x). 
In some literatures, Sj-(w) takes a lightly different form 
with the coefficient 2"" absent, so does the next de-
fmition 5(y)(M') . Hovvever the different forms do not 
bring any contradiction or inconvenience to the applica-
tions of Walsh transformation. 
Defmition 2^^-^^ 
5'</)(^ ) = 2-2(-l)"'"(-l)^*' ' = 2-X'(-1)"'"*^<" 
is defined as the type- II Walsh spectrum of n-tuple 
fijnction f(x). 
By the definition, S,f.{w)=—{\{xeGF{2")\f(x) = wx}\ 
By Theorem 1, it is easy to find the best linear 
approximation of/(.v) . Let \S(^f\{w)\-Max\Sff\{w){ and 
w 
w' is an arbitrary value different from w'. Jf S,.Jw') > O, 
then p(f(x) = w' »x) = i + S,.Jw) \ + S.^(w) = P(f(^) 
= w • J : ) > 
2 2 
i-5(y)(w ) _ p(f(^x) = w*x+\). It indicates 
that wtx\s the best linear approximation of f(x) . If 
5(y,(w')<0 , then P{f{x) = w'»x + \) = ^^^ 
l - 5 ( / ) ( v f " ) 
= P ( / ( j c ) = w •;c + l ) > ] + S,...{w 
2 2 
P{f{x) = w •x) . It implies that w*x + \ is the best 
linear approximation of f(x). 
Two types of Walsh spectrum both have some relation 
with the properties of Boolean fianctions as summarized 
in Theorem 2. 
Theorem 2^ '^^ ' For the n-tuple Boolean ftinction f(x), 
(1) f(x) is balanced if and only if Sj-(Q) = — or 
(2) Identify two kinds of linear structure set U^ and 
t/|'* with {a\f(x) + f(x + a) = 0) and {a\f(x) + f{x + 
a) = 1} respectively. We have that « e [/|"' if and only if 
for any weGF(2") and wa=\ , S^^.^(w) = 0 . We 
also have that OTEC/J-" if and only if for any 
we GF{2") and vv• a = O,S^ f-,{w) = O. 
(3) Nonlinearityof/(.x),A'/ = 2""'(l- Max \S(^f^(w)\) 
weG/--"(2) 
- ,n- l . 
1 
-\{xeGF{r)\fix)^wx}\)=—(2\{xsGF{2")\fix) = 
w x}\-2") = —(2"-\ {xe GFi2")\ fix) * w x}\) .That is tO 
2" 
say that type- II Walsh spectrum shows how much f{x) 
is close to the linear ftinction wx . The idea is 
described in the follovving theorem. 
Theorem l'^ ^ If w,xeGF(2") and f(x) is a n-tuple 
Boolean function, then 
l + 5(/)0v) 
2 
1 - S(f){w) 
2 
where P(») is the probability. 
or Nf=2"~'{\-Max{2 Max \S,Mw)i\\-2^Sf{(i)\)) . 
KeG/'"'(2)/{0} 
(4) f{x) is a Bent function if and only if for any 
n 
w€ G F{2"), 5'(y)(w) = +2 ^ or Sf(w) = • 
- - - 1 
± 2 2 _,v5tO 
P(fix) = wx)--
P(f(x) = M"X + \) = P{f{x)ltwx)--
± 2 2 - l /2 , i ) ' = 0 
( 5 ) f{x) satisfies SAC if and only if for any 
ae GF{2") and W„ia) = 1, X'^(/)("')(~')""' = ^ • 
»s Ži-
ce) f{x) satisfies PC for ae GF(2")\{0} if and only if 
E 5('/)0")(-ir'"=oor ;£s}ov)(-ir'"=5/(0)-i. 
QjeGF"{2) uieGF"(2) 
(7) f{x) satisfies PC of degree k if and only if for 
any aeGF"{2) and \<W{a)<k 
X ^(/)M(-l)""'" = O or J^sji.^^-ir'" = SfiO)-^. 
ft)eGF"(2) a<£C/-'"(2) 
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(8) f{x) satisfies PC of degree k and order m if and 
only if for any 1 </,<••• < ^  < «, a e Gf (2'' ),1 < W{a) < k , 
I ( S^(/)"''"^("'''"'2)(-l)"-"'')'(-l)° :0 
K^^GF"-"(2) w,eGF*(2) 
iv2eGF"-*(2) H ' | S G F ' ( 2 ) 
5;s(!--''*)(w,,0)(-l)--' - i ,where S().'-''*\TV,,W2) = 
W | E C F ' ( 2 ) 
(^^ jCvt'), and the k bits in the positions i,,-••,it of w are 
the bits of w, and the other bits are the bits of iVj. 
(9) f(x) satisfies CI of order m if and only if for any 
we GF"{2) and 1 < W{w) < m , S^^^(w) = O or S^{w) = O . 
4 Application in the Analysis of AES 
As discussed in the previous section, Walsh spectrum is 
quite povverful in the analysis of Boolean functions of 
block ciphers. We have found here its application in the 
analysis of AES. For convenience, we compute the type-
II Walsh spectrum (enlarged 256 times) of ali eight 
Boolean functions of the AES S-box and list them in 
Table 2 where the first digit of each line is256*Sy-(0) 
and the last one 256*5^ (^255). Fig.3. visually presents the 
spectrum of / 4 . For simplicity, no type- I Walsh 
spectrum is listed any more. In fact, it is very easy to 
derive the type- I Walsh spectrum directly from the 
type- II one as illustrated in Theorem 3. 
Theorem 3' [7] Sf{w)-- ~Y'^(/)("')'^'"'° 
1 - % ) ( H ' ) 
vc = 0 
Table 2 256 times of type-II Walsh spectrum of AES 
Boolean functions 
Functions 
ro 
n 
type- l l Walsh spectrum 
0,24,4,12,-16,16,12,-20,4,-20,-8,0.-12,-28,16,16.-24,0,-20,4,24,8,4,4,28, 
28,-16,-24,12,-20,-8,-8,12,4,16,24,-4,-4,-8,-8,16,-24,4,-4,0,-32,-4,12,-12, 
-4,-8,0,4,4,16,0,-8,0,12,-28,-24,-24,-12,20,8,-16,12,4,24,-24,4,20,-20,-12, 
16,24,-20,-4,8,-24,-24,16,12,20,-8,-8,-12,4,12,-12,-16,-24,12,-20,-8,-8,-
12,12,24,0,-12,-12.0,-32,-24,16,-20,-12,24,8,20,20,-28.12,8,-16,4,-28,0,-
16,-24,0,12,-12,24,8,4,-12,-24,16,12,4,-8,24,-28,-28,-28,12,8,16,4,4,-32,-
16,-16,-24,4,28,-16,16,-4,12,-4,20,-16,-8,12,-20,8,8,4,-4,-8,-32,-12,4,16, 
0,-16,-8,4.-20,16,16,-4,-20,12,4,-16,8,12,-20,8,-8,24,0,-4,-12,-24,24,-12, 
4,-16,-24,20,28,-32,-16,28,-20,28,4,16,24,12,12,8,-8,0,8,20,-4,0,-16,-4,-
4,-20,4,-16,-8,-20,-20,-24,-24,12,4,0,8,12,-4.24.-24,-8,16,28,-12,24,-24,4, 
4,12,4,16,8,-4,28,-24,24,8,0,28,4,-8,24,4,4 
0,0,16,16,4,20,12,-4,4,-4,-20,4,8,0,24,-16,-4,-4,12,-4,-16,0,24,-8,-24,0,0, 
8,12,4,12,-12,-20,-4,-4,-20,24,-24,0,16,8,16,-16,-8,4,-4,-12,-20,-24,24,8, 
8,20,4,12,-20,12,-12,-12,-20,-8,-16,8,16,-8,-8,-16,16,-12,-12.20,-12,-20,-
28,12,4,-8,-32,16,24,12,12,4,-12,8,-24,8,24,-24,0,-8,0,4,12,12,-28,4,-28, 
12,12,24,8,8,24,16,-24,-32,-8,4,28,12,4,-8,-8,16,0,-4,-20,-4,28,12,4,28,4, 
0,-8,-24,-16,-24,-16,0,8,-20,20,12,-12,-12,4,-12,-28,-8,24,-16,16,-12,-20, 
12,20,24,16,24,-32,-24,-24,-8,8,-4,12,4,4,4,-20,-4,4,-16,8,-16,-24,24,-24,-
8,8,20,4,-20,-4,-32,24,-24,16,-4,4,12,4,28,28,28,12,-8,24,16,0,0,-8,16,-24, 
28,4,4,-20,-20,12,-12,20,-8,-8,-24,-24,4,-20,-12,-20,16,-24,-8,0,24,-24,16, 
-16,-28,-12,4,-28,-4,4,28,4,-16,24,8,-16,-16,0,-24,-8,-28,4,-28,4,-16,8,0,-
24,4,-4,12,-12,12,12,4,20,-16,-32,16,16 
12 
a 
f4 
f5 
f6 
a 
0,28,4,24,12,-24,16,-12,8,12,28.-8.20,24,-8,-28.-12,0,16,20,24,-12,-12,24, 
-12,8,-16,-4,24,-4,-28,16,-4,0,24,4,-16,20,28,24,12,-8.24,12,-16,-4,-4,0,-
16,-12,-12,0,-4,-16,16,-4,-24,-12,-20,0,4,0,8,-4,-24,-28,-28,-8,-12,16,-16,-
12,-8,-4,20,16,4,8,-16,^,-12.16,8,-4,8,-12,-4,16,-20,16,-16,-20,0,20,-12,-
16,4,24,-24,-28,-8,12,12,-8,28,-8,32,4,0,-4,-28,24,-16,-12,-4,8,12,0,-24, 
20,0,12,-4,16,-20,8,-24,-4,32,20,-12,0,4,-24,-24,-12,0,12,-12,24,-12,16,8, 
12,-12,-24,16,-4,-16,4,-4,24,-4,8,-24,12,-24,-12,20,8,28,-24,24,12,24,-12, 
20,8.20,-8,-16,-4,-16,4,-4,-24,32,-4,20,24,20,-16,-24,28,16,4.20,16,-28.-8, 
-8,4,-16,4.12,-8,4,8,-16,28,-8,-28,4,8,-4,24,-24,-20,-4,0,0,-4,-8,-4,12,24,-
4,-8,32,-12,8,4,12,-16,-4,-8,16,20,8,20,-4,0,-4,16,32,-4,8,-20,-4,24,24,20, 
4,8.12,-24,24,-20.0,-12,-20,8.-12,8,-16,28 
0,24,12,-12,12,28,24,-8,0,16,-12,-12,-12,-4,24,16,-4,4,-16,24,-8,24,-4,-4,-
12,-12,-16,16,-24,0,4,-4,-24,-8,-12,-12,-4,20,8,-16.16.8,-12,-4,-20,-20,0,-
16,4,-28,-8,-8,-8,32,-4,-28,-12,-4,0,-24,0,16,-20,-4,32.0.4,-12,12,-12,16,8. 
-24,16,4,-4,-4,12,-24,8,28.12,24,8,-8,-16,4,-4,-4,20,-16,-24,16,16,-28,4,-
16.-8,4,28,-28,4,24,-24,0,0,-4,12,-4,-12,8,-16,-4,20,8,0,16,32,-20,-4,20,4,-
24,24,0,8,-12,28,28,4,-24,16,8,-8,20,-28,-12,20,24,24,8,-16,-4,-28,0,24, 
20,28,12,12,-16,0,-16,0,-4,-4,-12,-20,0,8,-28,-28,16,-16,-8,16,4,-4,-12,-4, 
8,16,16,-16,20,-12,24,-24,12,12,28,4.0,24,-16.8.12,20,12,-4,8,-24,20,-12,-
24,-24,0,24,-12,12,-12,-4,-16,24,8,-24,-12,20,-24,24,-12,20,20,-4,-16,-24. 
32,24,20,28,4,20,-8,-8,4,12,8,-16,-8,8,-4,-20,-4,-4,-8,24,-8,32,4,12,-8,16, 
20,-4,-4.-4.8,24,24.8,12,-20,-12,-20,8,-16 
0,16,-4,20,24,8,4,12.24,-24,-4,-12,0,0,4,-4,-16,8,-12,-12,-24,0,12,-4,-8,-
16,20,20.-16,24,-4,28,4,-12,32,-8.-28,20,16,-8,-12,4,-24,0,20,20,-24,0,12, 
-12,-16,0,12,-12,16,16,12,-12,-8,-24,28,20,24,8,12,12,0,-8,28,-20,32,24,-
4,12,8,16,-20,-4,24,16,-28,-20,0,0,20,-20,-16,16,4,-4,-24,24,-28,-4,-8,24,-
8,8,-4,-28,32,0,20,-4,16,16,28,-12,-24,8,20,-4,8.16,20,20,-16,-24,-4,-4,-
16,8,-12,4,-8,-16,12,12,-16,-24,-12,-28,16,24,-12,-28,-16,24,-4,-4,16,-8, 
12,-4,8,-24,4,-4,-24,24,20,-20,24,-24,12,20,-24,24,-4,-12,28,20,-16,0,-12, 
-4,8,24,-12,28,32,0,-4.4,24.8,-4,12,8,-16,-12,-12,-16,24,4,4.24,16,-4,28, 
16,-8,-4,4,-24,-8,4,12,-16,16,-12,-4,-8,8,-20,4,32,16,-20,-4,-16,8,-12,-28, 
8,-16,-12,4,0,24,-4,28,-24,0,0,-8,-20,12,-16,8.-4,12,0,-8,20,-12,-16,-8,-12, 
-12,24,8,-4,-12,8,24,-4,4,8,-8,4,-4,-24,8,-28,-4 
0.-8,16; 8,-3 2,24,16,-24,12,4,-20,4,4,-4,-12,12,-20,4,4.12,-12,12,-4,4,-8,-
16,-16,24,-24,0,0,-24,0,0,-8,-8,-16,-16,24,-8,-12,4,12,-4,28,12,20,-28,-12, 
4,4,4,28,-20,12,12,24,24,24,8,-24,-24.-8.8,-16,-24,16,-24,0,-8,16,8,28,4,-
20,-12,-12,-4,4.-20,-20,-12,4,-4,-12,28,-20,4,-8,16,-16,24,24,16,0,-24,16, 
16,-8,-8,16,16,-8,24,4,4,-20,-20,12,12,4,4,4,4,20,-28,-20,12,12,-4,8,-24,8, 
24,-24,8.8,-8,-24,16,8,0,24,16,8,-16,20,-4,20,12,12,4,12,20,-28,-4.-20,4,-
4,4,4,12,-16,8,8,0,0,-24,8,-16,-8,-24,16,-16,24,-S, 16,0,-4,28,-28,-12,4,-12. 
-4,28.12.-4.-4.12,4,4,-28,4,0,-32,-16,16,-16,-32,0,16,-16,-24,-16,-8,0,8,0,-
8,-20,20,-20,4,-12,12,4,12,-20,-28,-28,-4,-12,-4,-4,-28,-24,16,-16,-8,24, 
16,0,-8,-32,0,24,8,-32,-16,-24,-24,-12,-12,28,12,-20,28,-12,20,4,-12,4,20, 
12,-20,12,12,-24,-8,-24,24,-8,24,8,-24 
0,8,-32,-24,4,-20,-4,-12,4,4,12,-4,-8,24,-24,-24;0,-8,-16,-8,4,12,12,20,4, 
4,-20,12,24,8,-24,8,-16,-24,0,8,4,-20,-4,4,-12,4,28,-20,-8,24,24.-24,16,-8, 
16,24,4,-20,12,4,4,20,12,12,8,24,-24,-8,-24,0,24,-16,-4,20,4,12,-4,-20,4,4, 
-16,0,0,-16,-8,-16,24,0,28,-28,-12,-4,-4,-4,4,-28,0,16,-16,16,-16,-8,0,-8, 
20,-20,12,4,-28,-28,-4,-4,-24,-8,24,-8,-32,8,-32,-24,-12,28,28,-12,-12,4,-
20,12,-24,24,-8,-24,-8,16,24,16,12,4,4,12,-20,12,-12,4,-16,-16,0,0,0,-8,-
16,24,-12,-4,28,-28,-12,4,28,12,24,24,-24,-8,-24,16,-8,16,28,-12,-12,-20,-
20,-4,-12,4,16,-16,16,0,16,-8,16,-8,4,-20,12,4,4,-28,-20,-4.-24,8,8,8,16,8, 
16,8,20,12,12,20.-28,4,-4,12,8,8,-24,8,-24,16,-8,16,-4,-12,4,28,12,12,4,4,-
32,-16,-32,0,-24,-16,8,0.-20,4,-12,12,-20,-4,-12,-28,16,-16,16,0,0,24,-16,-
24,-12,12,-20,20,4.20,12,12,-8,-24,24,8 
0,24,-4,12,-4.-12,-24,24,8,16,-12,-12,-4,-12,-24,-8,16,-8,-4,-4,-4,-28,-24,-
24,8,-16,20,-12,-4,-12,-8,8,24,16,4,-12,20,-4,0,0,16,-24,28.12,4,28,0,-16, 
16,8,-20,-4,28,4,8,-24,-8,32,-28,-28,12,-12,24,24,8,-16,-12,-12,-12.12,16, 
0,8,16,4,-28,12,-12,-24,8,24,-16,-28,20,4,12,16,-16,8,-16,20,-12,-4,4,24,-
8,-16,-8,-20,-20,-4,4,-8,24,-16,8,12,-4,-12,-4,32,0,24,0.20,-12,4,12,16,-
16,-24,16,-12,20.-4,-12,8,-8,-8,32,20,4,-4,4,8,24,0,8,-4,-20,-4,20,-8,24,24, 
0,20,4,12,20,8,24,-16,-24,-4,-4,-20,-12,-24,24,0,-24,-20,-4,4,-4,16,16,8. 
0,-28,4,4,-4,-16,16,8,0,20,-12,28,4,24,8,32.24,12,12,-4,20,-24,8,-16,-24,-
4,-4,20,-4,16,0.0,-24,12,28,-4,-28,-24,24,-16,8,12,12,20,-4,-16,0,-16,8,-4, 
-4,28,20,-8,-8,-8,-16,-12,-12,28,-12,-8,-8,24,-16,4,-28,-12,-4,16,32,16,-8,-
4,12,20,28,-16,0,0,24,12,-20,-20,-12,24,-24 
We can veriiy the data in Table 2 with the Plancheral 
2"-l 
formula l^Sj-{w) = Sf(0)-T"Wff(f) or the Parseval 
vt=0 
2 " - l 
formula •^5'/^ n(^ *') =' • 
w=0 
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Fig. 3. 2S6 times of type-II Walsh spcctrum of / 4 
By Theorem 2 and data in Table 2, we draw some new 
conclusions about AES Boolean function as follows. 
(1) The best linear approximations corresponding to the 
eight Boolean functions are x^+x,+x^+Xf, + ] , 
;c5 +1, X2 +1, J:, +1 and ;c5 + ^ 4 + jfj + x„ respectively. 
(2)Eight Boolean functions are ali balanced. 
(3)No any non-zero linear structure exists in the eight 
Boolean functions (The zero vector is a linear structure 
of any function ) . 
(4)Nonlinearity of eight Boolean functions are ali 112 
and none of them is Bent function. 
(5)None of the eight Boolean functions satisfies SAC of 
any order or PC of any degree or any order. 
(6) None of the eight Boolean functions is correlation 
immune. 
(7)For 32 inputs, i.e. x = 11,33,35,39,43,51,90,93,106,122, 
134,139,142,157,164,165,170,178,192,193,194,197,217, 
129,230,232,237,240,243,249,250,255, /„ satisfies PC. 
Similar conclusions about /] ~ /7 can be obtained and 
are omitted here. 
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5 Conclusion 
From the view of Boolean function and with the tool of 
Walsh spectrum, we have studied several cryptographic 
properties of AES S-box. We found that AES Boolean 
fiinctions satisfied the cryptosystem design requirement 
such as balancedness, high nonlinearity and few linear 
structures. This indicates that AES has good nonlinear 
features which guarantee its cryptographic strength to 
some extent. On the other hand, none of the AES 
Boolean functions satisfies SAC of any order or PC of 
any degree or any order, which we think may contribute 
to the cryptanalysis of AES. Further work is worthwhile 
in this point. 
Moreover, the concepts of general autocorrelation'*' we 
proposed in another paper and that of autocorrelation will 
simplify the analysis of SAC, PC and its order. 
